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ABSTRACT 
During the last two decades of New Public Management (NPM), reformist 
governments have transformed the principle underlying Australia’s government 
accountability from compliance to performance evaluation. This change has been 
instituted in three phases, against a backdrop of uncertainty, complexity, and the 
diverse interests of pressure groups. A Machiavellian interpretation of reform, 
focusing on resistance and power, proposes that the development of public sector 
accounting in Australia has been highly politicized and characterized by power 
battles between the accounting profession and government departments. This is 
illustrated by analyzing the process by which a policy for the valuation of public 
sector assets in Australia was developed. The result is that control over accounting 
standard setting has been wrested from the accounting profession by the government, 
using the adoption of international financial reporting standards as a catalyst for 
change, at the expense of professional and governmental accountability.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Principles of responsible government at the heart of Australia’s Westminster system 
have transformed progressively in the past two decades from compliance to 
performance evaluation.  The origin of this transformation was the shift of public 
administrative reform towards commercialization and New Public Management 
(NPM) throughout OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) countries.  These reforms have been both a response to rapidly 
expanding demands for public sector accountability and a consequence of initiatives 
by reformist governments to achieve a performance culture within the public sector. 
Central to NPM was the reform of governmental accounting from a fund system to 
the adoption of a commercially-orientated accrual accounting system.  This paper 
reviews and evaluates the accounting and accountability reforms of NPM, the 
ascendancy of the accounting profession as part of the reform process and the 
decline of accounting profession dominance in the standard setting process 
following the adoption of international accounting standards in both the public and 
private sector. 
Political participation in the policy reform process will be specifically addressed 
including the role of the accounting profession and the adoption of accrual 
accounting in the public sector.  The political dynamics of reform and the motivation 
of participants in the decision making process will be analysed from the perspective 
of the sixteenth century political scientist, Niccolò Machiavelli.  For this purpose, 
reference is made to The Prince and The Discourses in which Machiavelli (1970, 
1988) provides political leaders with guidelines about strategic action for seizing and 
maintaining power.  On the basis of this analysis, the paper will argue that the 
doctrine of responsible government has had little involvement in the development of 
policies governing public sector financial reporting and accountability.  Contrary to 
the principles of the Westminster system, policy formulation is not a politically 
neutral process.  The bureaucracy and the governing parties capture each other in 
order to progress their own interests.  
The paper will take the following format.  Australia’s system of government and the 
power structure of the bureaucracy will be outlined first. Following this, issues of 
accountability and financial reporting will be introduced, and will then be 
highlighted further in discussion about th eprocess by which government accounting 
systems have been devloped. The notion of public sector reform will then be 
considered from the viewpoint of Machiavelli’s political insights, and applied to the 
Australian context. Three phases of this reform will be identified, and the role of the 
accounting profession in this process analysed. Conclusions will be drawn about the 
Australian government’s political behaviour in overcoming reform resistance.  
AUSTRALIA’S SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT: THE POWER STRUCTURE 
OF AUSTRALIAN BUREAUCRACY  
The Commonwealth of Australia was established in 1901. The name refers to the 
federation of the six former self-governing British colonies, now six states: New 
South Wales (NSW), Queensland, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western 
Australia. The system of government is based on a constitutional monarchy 
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combined with representative or parliamentary democracy (The Constitution, 2003). 
This means the Australian government is ruled under its constitutional system, 
acknowledging Queen Elizabeth II, who as the monarch, is the formal head of state. 
The Queen is a figurehead, and performs ceremonial functions only without 
exercising political power. The Australian Constitution places the power in the 
hands of the people who elect representatives to act on their behalf. These 
representatives form parliaments and compose governments to make legislation and 
policies.  
Government in Australia includes the Commonwealth or Federal Government, the 
six State governments, the two Territory governments and local governments. Under 
the Australian Constitution, each State is authorized to preserve its own constitution 
and parliament, exercising legislative powers (The Constitution, 2003, s.106 & 107). 
Although the power of making laws in relation to the Territories is vested in the 
Commonwealth Parliament, they have been conferred a large measure of self-
government and are treated like states (The Constitution, 2003, s.122). Political 
power is distributed between the Commonwealth and six states and exercised by 
their parliaments, but if there is conflict between Commonwealth and State powers, 
Commonwealth law may override State law (The Constitution, 2003, s.199).                                           
The constitutional power of the people is organized through the power structure of 
Australian bureaucracy. The Australian Government is chosen by the democratically 
elected parliament. Parliaments, Federal and State, as the legislature, are composed 
of chambers or houses. A parliament which consists of a single house, is called a 
unicameral legislature. In Australia, apart from Queensland and the two Territories, 
all State Parliaments are bicameral, with two chambers: the upper and lower houses. 
In the Commonwealth, the name of the upper house is the Senate, and the name of 
the lower house is the House of Representatives. The party which has a majority of 
seats in the House of Representatives becomes the executive government, with the 
leader of the party commanding a majority becoming the prime minister. The same 
system applies throughout all eight states and territories. After forming the 
government, the elected parliament exercises its legislative power to make laws. The 
power of implementing these laws rests in the executive government, and judicial 
power rests in the courts to enforce laws. The Parliament, the Executive Government 
and the Judiciary are known as the three “arms” of Australian Government 
(Australian Public Service Commission, 2003, p22). 
Although the executive government is chosen through elections, the leader who 
retains the majority support of the House of Representatives, needs to be appointed 
by the Governor-General, who represents Queen Elizabeth II (The Constitution, 
2003, s.64). The powers of the Governor-General are known as “reserve powers”. 
They refer to the power to appoint and dismiss a Prime Minister, and the power to 
force the dissolution of the Parliament or to refuse to dissolve the Parliament (The 
Constitution, 2003, s.2). In exercising a reserve power, the Governor-General 
ordinarily acts on the advice of government Ministers, except in exceptional 
circumstances, for example, in 1975, when the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr 
dismissed the Prime Minister, Mr. E.G. Whitlam.  
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The power structure of the Executive Government of the Commonwealth is 
illustrated in Figure 1. The appointed Prime Minister and the senior executive 
officers form the Cabinet. The Cabinet, with the assistance of its government 
agencies, exercises authorized powers and governs the country by making, enforcing 
and delivering laws and policies.  
Take in Figure 1 
This Westminister system is also commonly known as responsible government. The 
term “responsible” describes the system of executive government accountability, 
first to the parliament and ultimately to the people (Fuller & Roffey, 1993). 
According to Parkin (2006, pp.3-5), this involves two main sets of ideas: the 
democratic and the liberal. Democratic ideas promote the notion that government is 
ultimately accountable to its citizens. They are elected by a majority of citizens in a 
free vote, and the country is governed in the interests of the community. Liberal 
ideas promote the notion that although governments are chosen by a majority of 
citizens, they are constrained in their capacity to override the interests of minorities 
or individuals.   Thus, the accountability of a democratic government like Australia 
is not only manifest in democratic elections, but is also evident in public policy, 
which should be community-oriented.  
ACCOUNTABILITY, FINANCIAL REPORTING AND POLICY 
FORMATION 
It is clear that accountability is at the heart of the Australian Government system, 
although there is no certain agreement on the definition of public accountability or 
accountability itself. In general terms, Funnell and Cooper (1998, p30) perceived 
that to be accountable meant “an obligation to answer for one’s actions and 
decisions which arises when authority to act on behalf of an individual or body (the 
principal) is transferred to another (the agent)”. Fuller and Roffey (1993, p151) 
protrayed accountability as fundamental to Australia’s system of government so that  
“those to whom such power and responsibilities are given are required to exercise 
them in the public interest”. The Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration (RCAGA) raised issues of accountable management in the public 
sector and saw responsibility and accountability as closely related concepts. Thus, in 
broad concept, accountability could be referred to as the responsibility that 
government institutions or individuals are required to take for their discretions, 
vested by law, in the public interest.   
In a more specific sense, accountability has been defined often as the applied 
outcome of an accounting reporting function or an explanation or justification of 
actions (Patton, 1992). In this respect, accounting has been viewed as a system of 
techniques providing evidence of government’s performance and accountability. The 
former NSW Premier Nick Greiner (1990, p31) said of public sector accountability 
that “it involves the fundamentals of honesty, openness, adequate disclosure and 
careful, effective application of resources”. He added that: 
[b]y increasing community knowledge of the government’s financial 
affairs, the financial statements are further evidence of the government’s 
determination to improve its accountability. It is through knowing the 
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facts that the community and government can make rational decisions 
about spending, staffing, investment, taxation, pricing, borrowing and 
debt. Improved public accountability is the best way of ensuring both 
economic efficiency and, just as importantly, social sensitivity (Greiner, 
1990, p33).  
Government performance and accountability is assessed through financial reporting 
information in relation to the traditional role of government in performing public 
duties. This includes the provision of public goods, efficient and effective 
management of government resources so as to minimize the cost of providing public 
services, social justice programs to bring about a more equitable distribution of 
income and wealth, and macroeconomic management of the economy (Parker & 
Gould, 1999). The traditional role of government reflects the government’s multi-
dimensional responsibilities involving issues of the economy, social welfare, equity 
and ethics.  
Historically, information on the financial operations and performance of government 
were provided through a cash-based Fund accounting system under the Westminster 
system of government. The significant shortcoming of Fund Accounting is its over-
emphasis on the accurate recording of cash receipts and cash payments, with little 
concern about resource management by the government. Under the Fund system, 
only cash transactions are recorded and cash spent on a non-current asset is treated 
in the same way as cash spent on wages. The system does not produce any records 
of assets. For example, in the 1989-90 Annual Report of the National Museum of 
Australia, although there was a significant cost incurred in acquiring museum 
collections, the items were not capitalized and recorded as assets (see National 
Museum of Australia Annual Report, 1989-90).  
As argued by Funnell & Cooper (1998), the failure to record and recognize an asset 
and its related consumption and maintenance means that the full cost of government 
activities or service delivery cannot be calculated accurately. In such a situation, 
there would be no liabilities for governments in discharge of their resources 
management and allocation; hence, the government would not be fully accountable.  
The inadequacy of Fund accounting resulted in the adoption of the private sector’s 
accrual financial reporting system during the NPM reform of the 1990s. Accrual 
accounting enables a distinction between capital and operating expenditure and takes 
into account non-cash transactions such as asset depreciation. This is deemed 
important in terms of the assessment of government’s financial performance and 
resource allocation.  
The concept of commercially-oriented accrual accounting emphasizes economic 
rationalism, where resource allocation decisions are predominantly made on the 
basis of financial cost and benefit analysis. The notions of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness have permeated new public sector accountability during the NPM 
reform. Proponents argued that improved accountability would result as accrual 
accounting introduced the ability to measure performance and to assist in overall 
economic management and the formulation of policies of service delivery (Funnell 
& Cooper, 1998). 
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However, the major argument for the use of accrual accounting in the public sector 
is the model’s neoclassical economic philosophy, which is based on the assumption 
of a free market and individual self-interest. This may result in a diminished role of 
government in providing public goods, and its public accountability. McCrae and 
Aiken (1994) pointed out that the greater economic orientation of accrual accounting 
may trivialize many of the fundamental dimensions of accountability and 
responsibility inherent in the Westminster model of government.  
Funnell and Cooper (1998, p296) argued that the new accountability applied to the 
public sector has enabled central government to shift responsibility and blame to the 
private sector in the event of problems. This has been reflected in the fact that the 
government successfully took control over accounting standard setting from the 
accounting profession after the corporate collapses of the late 1990s. Earlier, 
Hopwood (1985) had suggested that accounting may provide freedom and 
opportunity for an organization to be unaccountable through appealing to legitimate 
action. This was apparent when the Australian Accounting Research Foundation 
(AARF), a private sector accounting standard setter, merged with the Australian 
Accounting Standard Board (a government body) through accounting reform in 1991.  
POLICY PROCESS AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING REGULATION 
As mentioned earlier, under the principles of responsible government, policy 
orientation is shaped by broad community-oriented notions of governmental 
accountability: 
[t]he main concern in deciding policy should be to act for the common 
good … while the interests and claims of individuals and groups are 
ingredients to be added to the cauldron of policy making, the final 
decision should reach beyond particular concerns to a broader sense of 
the interests of all (Galligan 1996, p455).  
This implies that the objective of policy making is to achieve the desired outcome, 
which is in response to the community in general. Under the notions of democratic 
participation, policy is formulated by political parties in the best interest of the 
people, while the bureaucracy is perceived as a politically neutral instrument of 
implementing policy, and not a powerful governmental institution in its own right 
(Hawker et al, 1979). This rational approach of policy process is illustrated in Figure 
2. Theoretically, policy demands emerge from the electorate or the community and 
are articulated through interest groups. They are then aggregated by governing 
parties. The Cabinet makes the choice between proposals and introduces the policy 
proposal to the Parliament. After parliamentary debates, if the proposal is passed by 
both Houses, the proposed policy is legitimized and then implemented by public 
servants. The legitimized policy becomes an Act of Parliament or a Legislative 
Instrument such as Finance Minister’s Orders (accounting policy guidelines issued 
by Department of Finance and Administration).  
Take in Figure 2 
In the Australian governmental accounting policy domain, regulating the reporting 
activities of departments and statutory authorities is determined by the central 
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agencies of Treasury and the Department of Finance (now the Department of 
Finance and Administration). For example, the traditional Commonwealth fund 
accounts were prepared in accordance with accounting guidelines issued by 
Department of Finance pursuant to the Audit Act 1901 (Department of Finance, 1990) 
and the later Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Department of 
Finance and Administration, 2003). In the NSW government, governmental financial 
reporting was prepared according to Treasury’s Directions under the Public Finance 
and Audit Act 1983 (NSW Treasury, 1990).  
Since 1993, with the adoption of accrual accounting at all levels of government, 
accounting guidelines issued by the Department of Finance and NSW Treasury 
started requiring their departments and authorities to prepare their financial 
statements in accordance with Australian Accounting Standards and other relevant 
mandatory professional reporting requirement (Department of Finance, 1993).  From 
reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005, in Australia all reporting 
entities, including both private and public sector entities, have been required to adopt 
financial reporting standards issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB). The responsibility for developing Australian equivalent international 
accounting standards is undertaken by the Australian Accounting Standard Board 
(AASB). Accounting guidelines now issued by Department of Finance and 
Administration and NSW Treasury are generally based on the AASB standards. 
However, if there are inconsistencies between the requirements of the AASB 
standards and legislation, the legislative provisions prevail.   
The procedures of AASB standard setting follow a due process. The concept of due 
process originated in English law, based on the theory of natural justice which 
entails democratic participation (Galligan, 1996). Due process in accounting 
standard setting refers to the process of allowing public participation in standard 
setting, for example, making comment (e.g. Exposure Drafts) on proposed standards, 
so as to ensure that those standards are framed with reference to the common good 
(AARF, 1993). Thus, it is obvious that the principle of due process of setting 
accounting standards is consistent with the objectives of policy making under the 
notion of governmental accountability, in response to general community interests 
and needs. This would have directed the development of governmental financial 
reporting policy from its fund system to the final adoption of the international 
accounting standards.  
However, Hawker et al (1979, p22) suggested that policy process does not follow 
any neat rational model. Instead, he argued that the policy process is pluralistic. It 
consists of “continuing patterns of political and administrative activity that are 
shaped both by deliberate decisions and by the interplay of political and 
environmental forces”. Lucy (1985) stated that the bureaucracy is not a neutral 
governmental mechanism. He referenced a statement by the Liberal Party’s 
Committee of Review, which stated that: 
The bureaucracy is no longer mere adjuncts to government, public 
services departments have become powerful organizations in their own 
right, and like all other institutions, they tend to view the world through 
the filter of their own institutional interests (cited in Lucy, 1985, p275).  
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Emy and Hughes (1988) confirmed conflicting objectives between departments in 
making policies. They stated that clashes between the government agencies are not 
uncommon, for example, the Treasury, in its advice always places the problems of 
the economy in front by understating the effects of the political issues, in order to 
achieve its own departmental objectives (Wilenski, 1986).  
In fact, as will be shown, the policy development of governmental accounting 
deviates from the theories of responsible government. The policy process is shaped 
by complex interactions and conflicts between interest groups. Wilenski (1986, p173) 
asserted that this power struggle among interest groups is often disguised by the 
conception of governmental administration as a value-neutral activity: 
[t]hose who stand to lose consider that they have been performing their 
duties responsibly; they may think that proposals for change imply 
unjustified criticism … and will certainly see very clearly all the risks 
involved in such proposals. They will not regard their opposition as 
being self-interested and are likely to express their resistance in terms of 
national interest. They fight reform, and being power-holders are in a 
strong position to do so.   
Thus, the policy process involves the uncertainty and complexity of policy discretion, 
and the diversity of influences from pressure groups.  Accounting regulation was 
seized upon by both the accounting profession and the central government agencies 
(e.g. the Treasury) to establish their own power and interests instead of discharging 
professional or governmental accountability. Thus the development of public sector 
accounting in Australia has been highly politicized and characterized by power 
battles between the accounting profession and government departments.  
THEORY AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF REFORM APPLIED TO 
AUSTRALIA 
Australia’s earlier experience of public sector reform can be traced to the case of 
reform failure by the Whitlam Labor Government during its short life from 1972 to 
1975. According to Peter Wilenski (1986), the former Chair of the Australian Public 
Service Board, one of the most significant problems was the Whitlam Government’s 
lack of a majority in the Senate. This resulted in its inability to legislate reform 
programs. Under the unfavorable economic conditions of the time, the extensive 
reform programs were considered undesirable. They resulted in increased public 
expenditure and an expanded public sector, and consequently the government was 
unable to convince the electorate (Wilenski, 1986). Many reform programs were 
hence greeted with hostility by privileged groups, allowing a broad opposition of 
special interests to develop. As a result, Whitlam’s reform programs were rejected 
by the Senate. His government was dismissed by the Governor-General John Kerr 
and the Liberal Fraser Government was appointed on 11 November 1975. The 
reform experience of the Whitlam Government reveals the most important feature of 
reform, that it always takes place against resistance. Without the ability to achieve 
and keep power in the face of reform resistance, a reforming government will always 
result in failure because of the assaults on it by its opponents.  
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In general terms, the impetus for reform may vary with the context and with the 
values and purposes of the reformers or of the reforming government. In Self’s 
(1978) framework for the analysis of the forces for change in public administration, 
reform is seen as the product of an interaction between three overlapping arenas of 
behaviour and beliefs: the social, the political and the bureaucratic: 
The social arena is the widest, and refers to the accumulated sets of 
beliefs, expectations and grievances which the members of a society 
hold about its government and bureaucracy. The political and 
bureaucratic arenas refer in the first place to the attitude sets held by 
politicians about public servants and to public servants about themselves 
(Self, 1978, p313).  
Each of these three arenas generates its own agenda. The social agenda results from 
the interaction between bureaucracy and society, covering “not only service delivery, 
and the ‘responsiveness’ and ‘openness’ of government to the wants, complaints and 
grievances of clientele groups and of the public generally; but also the adoption of 
the rules, practices and norms of bureaucracy to social pressures and changes” (Self, 
1978, p313). The political agenda focuses on relationships between bureaucracy and 
political institutions. It covers issues including the relationship between ministers 
and officials, the responsiveness of departmental administration to political will, and 
the accountability of discretionary policy-makers to Parliament (Self, 1978). The 
bureaucratic agenda concerns the effective and efficient organization of government, 
emphasizing organizational structure, public management and other issues related to 
the performance of government (Self, 1978).  
These three agendas of reform share some aspects with Wilenski’s (1986) three 
categorization of the aims of reform. There are the searches for more efficient 
administration, for more democratic administration and for more equitable 
administration. According to Wilenski (1986), the social, bureaucratic and political 
agendas in public administration parallel the issues of equity, efficiency, and 
democracy respectively, because the demands for greater equity, efficiency and for 
democratic accountability have been the leading items on social, bureaucratic and 
political agendas. Thus, reform is usually considered to aim at improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of governmental operations and promoting the 
accountability of government.  
However, Wilenski (1986) further argued that as reform implied a change in the 
decision-making processes, there would be a redistribution of power and benefits 
among individuals or groups who are affected. This shift in power inevitably would 
result in resistance to reform. This view was also reflected in Caiden’s (1969, p1) 
definition of reform as "the artificial inducement of administrative transformation 
against resistance". He added that reform 
 … is power politics in action; it contains ideological rationalisations, 
fights for control of areas, services and people, political participants, 
power drives, campaign strategies and obstructive tactics, compromises 
and concessions (Caiden, 1969, p9). 
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Thus, despite the fact that reform varies in its initiatives and aims, it almost always 
takes place against a backdrop of resistance. Failure to recognize the various sources 
of opposition may result in a failure of reform efforts. This dynamic situation of 
reform resistance, in particular the power relationship between reformer and resisters, 
and its role of power in reform can be addressed by adopting Machiavelli’s political 
theory.  
MACHIAVELLI’S REFORM AND RESISTANCE 
Machiavelli is the author of arguably the two greatest works in political philosophy, 
The Prince and The Discourses, written in 1513 and 1518 respectively. For 
Machiavelli, reform was a political process, where politics was no more than one 
thing, acquiring and maintaining power. He believed that for a reformer or a political 
leader, success was dependent only on ability or skills to stay in power and enable 
change regardless of strength or deception. Anything else such as moral judgment 
should be secondary to getting, increasing and maintaining power (Machiavelli, 
1988). Machiavelli’s view of the nature of political rule was shaped by his 
pessimistic conception of human nature. He believed that most men had lost 
goodness, and that power and glory were the motivating forces of their action 
(Machiavelli, 1988).   An extension of this perception was Machiavelli’s view on the 
best way to achieve a stable regime through a balance of power (Machiavelli, 1970).  
Machiavelli believed that liberty was fundamental to regime stability. This could be 
achieved by reforming a society dominated by a popular republic. He suggested that 
the best form of government was a mixed government embodying the characteristics 
of three forms of regime: principality, aristocracy, and democracy: 
All the forms of government are far from satisfactory … Hence, prudent 
legislators, aware of their defects, refrained from adopting as such any 
one of these forms, and chose instead one that shared in them all, since 
they thought such a government would be stronger and more stable, for 
it in one and the same state there was principality, aristocracy and 
democracy each would keep watch over the other (Machiavelli, 1970, 
p109).  
This theory of mixed government shares some features with Australian government 
under the form of constitutional monarchy, in which the Australian constitution with 
its separation of power from the legislature, executive and judiciary is based on the 
idea of balance and the checking of power.  
Machiavelli’s reflections and the political proposals in his works refer directly to 
events in his life.  The Prince contains advice to a new prince (intended to represent 
Lorenzo de' Medici, the new ruler of Florence), who tried to reform or make a 
number of changes, in the early years of forming a new republic, or acquiring power 
in new territories. The recurring theme in Machiavelli’s works was that power 
should be with the people rather than the elite, the nobles:  
A man who becomes ruler through the help of the nobles will find it 
harder to maintain his power than one who becomes ruler through the 
help of the people, because he is surrounded by many men who consider 
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that they are equals, and therefore he cannot give them orders or deals 
with them as he would wish (Machiavelli, 1988, p34).  
Differing from The Prince, citizen liberty in a republic is the primary concern in The 
Discourses. This is because the book was a response to the Medici’s rule in Florence, 
which tried to impose a tyrannical regime and deprive citizens of the liberties they 
had enjoyed under a previous republic government.  
Overall, both The Prince and The Discourses provided strategies for a reformer on 
how to seize and maintain his power, when he wants to introduce new regulations to 
establish his position securely. This fundamental view about the political process 
and the nature of political rule can be applied in identifying two major elements of 
reform: resistance and the role of power.   
REFORM AND RESISTANCE 
According to Machiavelli, a new prince who tried to reform or make a number of 
changes would create many enemies among those indebted to the older order: 
There is nothing more difficult and dangerous, or more doubtful of 
success, than an attempt to introduce a new order of things in any state. 
For the reformer has for enemies all those who derived advantages from 
the old order of things, whilst those who expect to be benefited by the 
new institutions will be but lukewarm defenders. This indifference arises 
in part from fear of their adversaries who were favored by the existing 
laws, and partly from the incredulity of men who have no faith in 
anything new that is not the result of well-established experience 
(Machiavelli, 1988, p 20). 
Machiavelli’s argument involved two causes of opposition to reform: fear of change 
and the reluctance to relinquish power. The fear of change referred to the fear of 
uncertainty regarding the redistribution of gains and losses in new systems. As 
argued by Wilenski (1986), the existing system may be unsatisfactory, but at least 
the status, power and position of each individual within the bureaucracy is known 
and predictable. Reform implies changes in the decision-making process. Losers and 
winners cannot be identified beforehand. This results in reform resistance that is 
defensive of the status quo, combined with an attack on the initiatives by the 
reformer.  
In the case of Australian public sector reform, the fear of change is reflected in the 
differences about the desirability and acceptability of particular reform programs, 
including goals and the means employed to pursue them (Wilenski, 1986). This is 
evident in resistance on the part of the Australian State governments to adoption of 
accounting standards promulgated by the accounting profession during the period of 
NPM reform.  
The dynamics of the difficult position facing the reformer also reflect the second 
cause of resistance, the reluctance to relinquish power or advantage. According to 
Wilenski (1986), it is rare for power holders ever to surrender power and position 
voluntarily. However, reform, which is perceived by Machiavelli as a political 
process, involves a substantial shift in the power structure among groups within the 
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bureaucracy (Machiavelli, 1988). This will consequently bring about resistance, as 
existing power holders do not want to give up their advantages or power.  
For such opposition, Machiavelli emphasized the need to impress the elites 
(powerful groups) with displays of strong leadership and control. In Machiavelli’s 
analysis, a reformer needed to manage to distribute power between the people and 
the elites in a manner that controlled the latter. For Machiavelli, the people were 
better than the elites at distributing power, as he believed that elites were motivated 
by an insatiable will to dominate a position, whereas the people only wanted not to 
be oppressed. They would support the prince as long as he protected them from the 
elites. Machiavelli advised a reformer that 
a wise man will not ignore public opinion in regard to particular matters, 
such as the distribution of offices and preferments; for here the populace, 
when left to itself, does not make mistakes, or, if sometimes it does, its 
mistakes are rare in comparison with those that would occur if the few 
had to make such as distribution (Machiavelli, 1970, p228).  
From this, it can be argued that under contemporary democratic theory, for a 
reformer, controlling the powerful groups to make them accountable to the people is 
considered the most important strategy in enforcing reform and enabling change.   
The adoption of accrual accounting and commercial concepts of measurement and 
valuation in the public sector can be viewed as part of a strategy to facilitate change 
under the guise of making government more accountable or responsible to the 
electorate.   
REFORM AND POWER IN PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING 
The historical antecedents of the reform of accounting in the public sector in 
Australia featured three distinct phases during which the accounting profession 
sought to establish itself in an area hitherto outside its sphere of influence. The first 
phase (1970s) featured reform initiatives resulting from social, political and 
bureaucratic pressures. The second phase (1980-1983) saw the entry of the 
accounting profession into the public sector accounting domain by the introduction 
of accrual accounting into the public sector. In the final phase (1984-1988), the 
accounting profession reinterpreted the definition of assets so as to push commercial 
accounting principles into the public sector reporting environment.  
 Phase 1 (1970s): The Social, Political And  Bureaucratic Agendas 
 Preceding The Reform 
During a period of economic depression in the 1970s, there was widespread 
questioning of the functions, responsibilities and effectiveness of the federal and 
state public service in Australia. This broad questioning was reflected in the 
establishment of a wave of public service inquiries. These inquiries included reports 
of the Whitlam years: the 1973-1975 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the 
Public Service of South Australia (1974), the 1974-1975 Board of Inquiry in the 
Victorian Public Service (1975), and at the federal level, the 1974-1976 Royal 
Commission on Australian Government Administration (RCAGA) (1976). After 
Fraser became Prime Minister in 1975, there was the conduct of the Wilenski 
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Inquiry, the Review of N.S.W. Government Administration (1977) and other state 
inquiries: 
[t]ogether these reports came to a near identical definition of the problem 
with the Australian public sector – it had become too big, complex, 
unaccountable and was difficult to control using traditional centralized 
management strategies (Chua and Sinclair, 1994, p677).  
The RCAGA together with the RNSWGA were considered as “highly influential in 
thinking about public sector reform in Australia” (Halligan & Power, 1992, p120). 
The RCAGA commission’s recommendations ranged widely over efficiency, 
democracy and accountability issues. It expressed concern about the “excessively 
centralized, hierarchical, rigid and inflexible” government structure, and the 
resultant inadequacy and inconsistency of public sector financial reporting and their 
standards of accountability (RCAGA, 1976, p18). The Commission specifically 
recommended that  
the Treasury, the Auditor-General and suitable representatives from 
departments and the Public Service Board review the range of financial 
information available, and its content, and prepare alternative methods of 
publication which will reduce the amount of overlap between different 
reports (RCAGA, 1976, pp75-76).  
The introduction of efficiency reviews by the Auditor-General was seen as the most 
visible success (Wilenski, 1986, p185). The Commission also recognized the lack of 
expertise and knowledge within the public service in facing economic globalization, 
and suggested structuring the bureaucracy towards professionalism (RCAGA, 1976).  
The RNSWGA was subsequently launched and drew much of its inspiration from 
the RCAGA. The Review provided the more investigative view into the issues of 
governmental accountability, and reflected its belief in a “more efficient” business 
sector and the motivation of many critics of government administration, who 
compared its performance with the private sector as “insufficient” and 
“unaccountable” (Chua & Sinclair, 1994). Moreover, Wilenski (1986) indicated that 
the newly elected Fraser Government, and its younger breed of politicians, with 
great interest in managerial matters, provided a favorable environment for change.  
Thus, in Self’s (1978) words, these three overlapping agendas of reform, the social, 
the political and the bureaucratic, finally resulted in the NPM reforms in Australia 
for the purpose of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
administration and promoting governmental accountability. 
 Phase 2 (1980-1983): The Entry Of The Accounting Profession Into The 
 Public Sector Accounting Policy Domain 
Chua & Sinclair (1994) argued the broad findings of inquiries and the public belief 
in the ‘more efficient’ practice in business sector created the opportunities for the 
accounting profession to enter into the public sector accounting policy domain. 
Historically, Australian corporate financial reporting was largely regulated by the 
accounting professional bodies, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia 
(ICAA) and the Australian Society of Accountants (ASA, now CPA Australia), and 
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the Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF). On the other hand, the 
accounts of public sector entities were regulated by governments themselves. 
Government accounts were kept on a cash basis, and the work of government 
accounts was confined to bookkeeping, with very little involvement in public 
managerial skills and expertise. The ASA’s submission to the RCAGA pointed out 
that many accounting jobs in the public services were filled by persons who were not 
professionally credentialed by either the ASA or the ICAA (Chua and Sinclair, 
1994).  
This lack of managerial skills and expertise of many public servants and the 
increased social and bureaucratic demands for a ‘more efficient’ and ‘accountable’ 
public sector, provided opportunities for the Australian accounting profession to 
establish a substantial demand for professional accounting services in the public 
sector.  
Machiavelli saw an opportunity as the favorable time or set of circumstances, which 
provided permission for success. He believed that men are successful when their 
ways are suited to the times and circumstances, and unsuccessful when they are not. 
He argued that 
[o]pportunities then permitted these men to be successful, and their 
surpassing abilities enabled them to recognize and grasp these 
opportunities (Machiavelli, 1988, p20) .  
He illustrated the ancient example of Cyrus The Great, founder of the Achaemenid 
Persian Empire. He attributed Cyrus’s remarkable success to both his ability and 
opportunities. He argued of people like Cyrus that if “they had lacked opportunity, 
the strength of their spirit would have been sapped; if they had lacked ability, the 
opportunity would have been wasted” (Machiavelli, 1988, p20).  
In facing the demands of professional services in the public sector, the accounting 
profession demonstrated successfully its ability to grasp the opportunity, which 
finally resulted in its entry into public sector accounting standard setting.   The 
profession seized the perceived limitations of the cash-based fund system and lack of 
managerial skills and expertise in the public sector as an opportunity to demonstrate 
the need for it to play a dominant role in both the public sector accounting standard 
setting process and public sector financial reporting policy.  Specifically, through its 
financial reporting conceptual framework, the profession established a link between 
accrual accounting and public sector accountability. 
Support for accrual accounting as a means to enhance public sector accountability 
came from a number of Commonwealth and State parliamentary committees such as 
the Commonwealth Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Governance 
Operations (SSCFGO), Commonwealth Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA) 
and the Victorian Parliamentary Economic and Budget Review Committee (EBRC) 
(Ryan, 1998) and from Commonwealth and State Auditors-General (Wanna et al, 
2001).  The legitimacy of the accounting profession’s role in public sector financial 
reporting was confirmed with the establishment in 1983 of the Public Sector 
Accounting Standards Board (PSASB) under the auspices of the Australian 
Accounting Research Foundation (AARF) (Sutcliffe, 1985).  This victory for the 
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profession was all the more significant given the view expressed in Report 199 of 
the JCPA that public sector accounting standard setting should be located within the 
authority of the Department of Finance rather than controlled by the accounting 
profession (JCPA, 1982).  
 Phase 3 (1984-1988): The Reinterpretation Of The Definition Of Public 
 Sector Assets  
The government’s commitment to accrual accounting enabled the accounting 
profession to establish a central role in the public sector policy domain. However, 
debates about the appropriateness of commercial accounting concepts in the public 
sector environment persisted.  A prime focus of these debates was accounting for 
assets.  The source of contention revolved around differences in the reasons for 
acquiring and holding assets in the private sector as opposed to the public sector.    
Under the Westminster system of government, there is a traditional notion 
underlying public sector accounting that the ownership of all public assets resides in 
society, not in executive government. The role of the government is more like a 
trustee of the public resources, with ongoing accountability to society for its policy 
and for its use of resources (Barton, 1999).  In terms of public-sector asset valuation, 
the aim would be to produce non-financial and qualitative information, which would 
enhance the success of public sector asset management and accountability processes 
(Carnegie and Wolnizer 1995).   On the other hand, the commercial concept of an 
asset is characterized by aspects of service potential or future economic benefits, 
control and a past transaction as the three main elements of the definition. The future 
economic benefits and the control aspect are considered to be the most important 
components, which warrant the examination of an asset (Barton, 1999). A detailed 
discussion of the differences between assets in the public sector and assets in the 
private sector, is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, the public sector concept 
of heritage assets will be used to highlight these differences. 
Public sector heritage assets comprise a class of physical assets as defined by NSW 
Treasury (1989, p6): 
… those non-current assets that a government intends to preserve 
indefinitely because of their unique historical, cultural or environmental 
attributes. A common feature of heritage assets is that they cannot be 
replaced (e.g. monuments, historical museum collections, wilderness 
preserves and historic buildings).  
Heritage assets include art, museum and library collections, memorials, historical 
buildings, national parks and places of historical significance. They are maintained 
by the government for cultural, heritage, recreation and other community purposes 
rather than for the purposes of government administration or income generation.  
Some accounting writers such as Pallot (1990, p84) have classified those assets 
under a separate category of “community assets”. It is perceived that they play an 
important role in the development of a nation’s culture. They raise and enhance the 
quality of life of a nation. Consequently, it has been argued that these unique 
features of public heritage assets should orient its definition and valuation.  Burritt et 
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al (1996) claimed that public sector assets represent bundles of resources, 
contributed by the public to entities under the trusteeship of parliament and the 
management of successive governments. As indicated by Rowles (1992), reporting 
of heritage assets is essential from the perspective of improved resource 
management, performance and accountability. Communities and members of 
parliaments would also be interested to know the information about the stock of 
assets and the consumption of service potential.   
Public sector reform and the transition from a Fund System to accrual accounting 
saw the adoption of a policy consistent with the views expressed by Rowles (1992) 
whereby all public heritage facilities would be recognized as government assets and 
recorded in the financial statements. This can be seen in various public policy 
documents including SAC 4 (1992) Definition and Recognition of the Elements of 
Financial Statements, AAS 27 (1993) Financial Reporting by Local Government, 
AAS 29 (1993), Financial Reporting by Government Departments, AAS 31 (1996) 
Financial Reporting by Governments, and the Commonwealth and states’ own 
accounting guidelines for adoption by departments and statutory authorities (e.g. 
NSW Treasury 1989, Department of Finance 1995). These various policies, however,  
led to diversity in the definitions and valuation requirements of heritage assets. Until 
2003, with the uniform adoption of the fair value approach, there were different 
methods required by different government authorities or departments including not 
reporting them, reporting them at $1, and reporting them by applying methods used 
in the commercial sector, such as current replacement cost, deprival value and fair 
value.  
Even within the PSASB, there was doubt about the appropriateness of applying a 
commercial definition to public sector assets (Sutcliff, 1985). This represented a 
challenge to the successful implementation of full accrual accounting. In confronting 
challenges or difficulties, Machiavelli argued that a successful innovator can change 
events if he is able to persuade or force others to believe his schemes. He explained 
that  
[t]he people are fickle; it is easy to persuade them about something, but 
difficult to keep them persuaded. Hence, when they no longer believe in 
you and your schemes, you must be able to force them to believe 
(Machiavelli, 1988, p21).  
From this perspective, the accounting profession successfully resolved the 
difficulties in the definition of public sector assets, by reinterpreting rhetorically 
asset definition and recognition criteria that were sufficiently broad to encompass 
items held in the public domain. This is reflected in the “answer” produced in 1987, 
a series of Exposure Drafts (ED) issued by the PSASB, to form the basis of the 
Conceptual Framework for financial reporting in the public and private sectors 
(PSASB, 1987). ED 42A (1987), Objective of Financial Reporting, justified the 
application of private sector standards to the public sector. It stated that the 
objectives of financial reporting were fundamentally similar between business 
entities and non-business entities, because 
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while business entities seek to maximize profits or earn desired rates of 
return and non-business entities typically pursue service-related 
objectives, both types of entities provide goods and services to the 
community and use scarce resources in the process; both control stocks 
of resources; both incur obligations; and both must be financially viable 
to meet their operating objectives (ED 42A, 1987  para.13). 
Consequently, consistent with the above stated objective of financial reporting, the 
ED 42C (1987, para.7),  Definition and Recognition of Assets reinforced the notion 
of future economic benefit as “service potential or future economic benefits 
controlled by the reporting entity as a result of past transactions or other past events”. 
ED 42C further argued that this definition could be readily applied to all public 
assets, because future economic benefit could be substituted by service potential to 
beneficiaries provided by public assets. This was based on the reason that the 
purpose of goods or services provided by business or non-business, was to satisfy 
human wants and needs. Thus,  
[i]n non-business entities, including both government non-business 
entities and not-for-profit entities in the private sector, the service 
potential or future economic benefit is also used to provide goods and 
services in accordance with the entities’ objectives (ED 42C, 1987, 
para.13); 
As for the control aspect, ED 42C identified that items are required to be recognized 
as assets, depending upon the ability of the entity to benefit from the asset:  
[t]he capacity of an entity to control the service potential or future 
economic benefits would normally stem from legal rights and may be 
evidenced by title deeds, possession or other sanctions and devices that 
protect the entity’s interests. However, legal enforceability of a right is 
not a prerequisite to the establishment of control over service potential or 
future economic benefit (ED 42C, 1987, para.18). 
This interpretation successfully supplemented the view from Canning (1929) that 
possession or ownership of an object or right is not essential, and an entity could 
have an enforceable right to an asset without having ownership.  
The definition and interpretation of public assets in ED 42C effectively divorced the 
notion of future economic benefit from cash flows, and excluded “ownership” from 
asset definition. This meant that the concern identified in Monograph 5 about the 
inappropriateness of commercial accounting concepts in the public sector 
environment, had been addressed. Many items in the public domain, such as cultural, 
heritage and scientific collections and other community resources, would then be 
able to be recognized as assets in accrual-based financial reports.  
The hurdle to the successful carrying out of accounting reform in the public sector 
had been overcome and commercial accounting standards seemed to be ready for 
application to the public sector. The extended definition of assets was embraced in 
subsequent policy papers such as Accounting Theory Monograph 7 Definition and 
Recognition of Assets (Miller & Islam, 1988). Walker (1989) argued that these 
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documents provided the rationale for common standards and the impetus required 
for the accounting profession to successfully convince the government to proceed 
with the implementation of those proposals in 1989.    
IMPLEMENTATION OF ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING IN THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR IN AUSTRALIA 
The government of the state of New South Wales (NSW) was the first to implement 
the adoption of accrual accounting in the public sector in Australia. According to 
Ryan (1998), the NSW Government’s decision to adopt accrual accounting was 
shaped by two contemporary forces, political commitment by the newly elected 
Greiner Government and pressure from the NSW Commission of Audit. 
The Greiner election platform included public sector reform through an emphasis on 
improved management techniques, operating efficiency and financial results.  
Achievement of these goals turned on making government more business-like (Ryan, 
1998).  This was a significant period in the history of the implementation of accrual 
accounting in the public sector in Australia.  In initiating the reform of financial 
reporting and accountability in the NSW public sector, the Greiner Government 
formed alliances with influential members of the accounting profession including a 
senior US partner of Arthur Andersen & Co, the Australian Society of Accountants 
(now CPA Australia) and the then NSW Auditor-General, Mr Ken Robson, who 
coincidentally was a prominent member of the Australian accounting profession.  In 
1988, the report of the Commission of Audit, staffed by accountants from the large 
accountancy firms and units from Treasury and the Department of Finance (Groom, 
1990) advocated the adoption of accrual accounting in the NSW public 
administration (Christensen, 2003).  On successful election, the Greiner Government 
formally implemented accrual accounting in 1989. 
In accordance with Machiavelli’s political theory, both the accounting profession 
and Greiner’s Government identified and seized an opportunity to further their own 
respective ambitions and goals.  Both demonstrated leadership and control in the 
drive to improve public sector accountability but the underlying motive was not 
altruistic but self-centred.  In the final analysis, Greiner and his party won 
government while the accounting profession gained an opportunity to control not 
only the standard setting process in the private sector but also the public sector.   
In 1991, the accounting profession’s dominance of the standard setting process in 
Australia received a welcome boost with the passing of legislation to give the force 
of law to Australian accounting standards.  Under the Corporations Act 1991, 2M.3, 
failure to comply with an AASB standard constituted a breach of the legislation. In 
addition, the legislation replaced the Australian Standards Review Board (ASRB) 
with the newly established Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB).  
However, as will be discussed below, the establishment of the AASB with enhanced 
political power represented a threat to the power of the accounting profession and its 
domination of the accounting standard setting process. 
Nonetheless, throughout the decade of the 1990s, the profession strengthened its 
power over financial reporting in the public sector.  In 1991, full accrual accounting 
was extended to local government in Australia by the promulgation of Australian 
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Accounting Standard AAS 27 Accounting for Local Government.  In 1993, AAS 29 
Financial Reporting by Government Departments effectively brought accrual 
accounting to State and Commonwealth government entities.  Both standards 
required the application of accrual-accounting and the conceptual framework to 
government financial statements.  During this time, accounting guidelines issued by 
the Department of Finance (Commonwealth) and State Treasuries were amend to 
incorporate the concepts of financial reporting outlined in the conceptual framework 
(Department of Finance, 1993).  According to Ryan (1998), endorsement of the 
accounting profession dominated conceptual framework constituted the realization 
of a long-standing goal of the profession in general and the PSASB in particular.  By 
1996, the profession’s domination of accounting in the public sector was complete 
with the promulgation by the PSASB of AAS 31 Financial Reporting by 
Government applying to all Commonwealth, State and Territory governments.   
However, the following year so a reversal of government support for accounting 
profession domination of the accounting standard setting process. 
MACHIAVELLI AND THE SIDE-LINING OF THE ACCOUNTANCY 
PROFESSION 
The establishment of the PSASB and the advent of statutory backing for Australian 
accounting standards conferred upon the accounting profession significant influence 
in the formulation of public sector accounting policy, and in the setting of 
accounting standards to be applied in the public and private sectors. As already 
noted, however, the establishment of the AASB in 1991, with enhanced authority 
from Corporations Law, constituted a threat to the accounting profession’s position 
of power.  In 1997 the threat was realized with the establishment of the Corporate 
Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) by the Howard Liberal Government.  The 
Program reconstituted the AASB as a government body in the name of the public 
interest, and imposed accountability on the accounting profession to perform the 
government’s political objective of the adoption of the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) standards.  The genesis of the government’s desire to adopt 
international accounting standards can be traced to the Whitlam Government. 
Halligan & Power (1992) have argued that during the Whitlam years, governments 
exposed public policy to the influence of the international economy. This was 
evident when the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC, now the 
IASB) was established and Australia, under the Whitlam Government, became a 
member country. However, due to the significant influence of the accounting 
profession on the direction of policy formulation, this political will was not fulfilled 
until 1997, when the Howard Government announced CLERP. Consequently, 
CLERP saw control over accounting standard setting in both the private and public 
sector completely transmitted to the Commonwealth government. Once again, this 
turn of events can be analysed within Machiavelli’s political framework. 
According to Machiavelli (1988), the increased power of elite groups, in this case 
the accounting profession, is a barrier to a reforming government in pursuit of its 
own political will. Thus, Machiavelli further advised a prince who came to power 
through the influence of the nobles, to turn his allegiance to the people and dispose 
of the nobles by hacking them all to pieces, once he succeeded in stabilizing his 
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power (Machiavelli, 1970). The establishment of CLERP reflected the effective 
utilization of this strategy by the Howard Government.  
CLERP, as a form of corporate regulation, built its argument on protecting public 
interest against corporate failure (Clarke et al, 2003), and successfully shifted the 
power over accounting standard setting from the accounting profession to the 
government. Moreover, it was claimed that it would “ensure that business regulation 
is consistent with promoting a strong and vibrant economy and provide a framework 
that helps business adapt to global change” (Department of the Treasury, 1997).  
Under the new arrangement of CLERP 11, the structure of accounting standard 
setting was used to legitimize the government’s political will, seeking to increase the 
influence of the international marketplace on the Australian economy. The role of 
the AARF was hence reduced, and the PSASB was disbanded, with all the 
responsibilities of these two bodies for developing accounting standards for both the 
public and private sector being transferred to the restructured AASB. The Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC), as an overseer, was established under the control of 
Commonwealth Treasury, aiming at ensuring that the AASB standard setting 
process be committed to the adoption of International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) standards. This, it was argued, would help Australian corporations to raise 
capital in international capital market. This change in the power structure of 
accounting standard setting can be viewed in Figures 3 and 4, which adopt diagrams 
from Henderson et al (2006, p11 & 14).  
Take in Figure 3  
Take in Figure 4  
Obviously, under the post-CLERP structure, the power of the accounting profession 
in setting accounting standards has been greatly reduced. Australian accounting 
standard setting is now controlled by the Commonwealth Treasurer, whereas the 
accounting profession’s influence is only exercised through consultative groups.   
Applying Machiavelli’s perspective to this case reveals that the government’s 
ambition to become powerful over the accounting standards setting process has been 
achieved.  The accounting profession no longer participates in policy formulation.  
In other words, the profession was an instrument of the Commonwealth and State 
governments in public sector reform.  Briefly, the profession was rewarded with a 
dominant position in the standard setting process.  However, once the profession had 
outlived its usefulness, the Commonwealth Government relegated it to a subordinate 
position in order to pursue the Government’s own agenda to facilitate the access of 
Australian companies to global capital markets. 
In achieving its purpose, the government focused attention away from public sector 
accountability to the role of accountants in the unexpectedness of corporate failures. 
In particular, the accounting profession was blamed by the government for its 
inadequate and unenforceable accounting standards.  The validity of this stance is 
debatable. Cooper (1997, p3), for example, argued that corporate collapse was 
                                                 
[1] The first paper of the CLERP, Accounting Standards: Building International Opportunities for 
Australian Business.  
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“characterized by a recurring cycle of regulatory failure, regulatory reform”, where 
regulatory failure was not restricted to the accounting standards promulgated by the 
accounting profession.  Deficiencies in government regulatory bodies were also 
evident in corporate failures.  Similarly, Funnell and Cooper (1998) pointed out that 
reforming public sector accounting to a commercial model enabled the central 
government to shift responsibility and blame to the accounting profession in the 
event of financial reporting failures by public sector entities.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The system of accountability inherent in the Westminster mode of government is at 
the heart of Australia’s system of government. It has been traditionally understood 
that government institutions or individual public servants are required to be 
accountable for their decisions in the public interest. Under this doctrine, policy 
process is orientated to broad societal notions of governmental accountability. The 
bureaucracy, as a policy implementing mechanism, is supposed to operate in 
response to political demands, which are transmitted from social needs.  
Australia’s experience of public sector accounting reform and the adoption of 
accrual-accounting in order to make public sector entities more business-like 
demonstrates the validity of Machiavelli’s political philosophy. Reform, as a 
political process, involves a substantial shift in the power structure among powerful 
groups within the bureaucracy. The progression of reforming public sector 
accountability through the adoption of private sector bench marks and accounting 
standards set solely by the accounting profession demonstrates Machiavelli’s 
political theory in action.   
The reformer, the Commonwealth and State governments, sought the support of an 
elite, in this case, the accounting profession, successfully to institute reform that was 
premised on serving the public interest. While the reformer espoused altruistic 
reasons for the new order, the reality is that the reformer’s motives were self-
centered.  When the reformer’s aspirations were realized, the facilitating elite were 
eliminated so that the reformer could implement further self-serving reforms. In 
other words, the claim of enhancing public accountability and improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public administration was secondary to obtaining and 
maintaining power. Once this was achieved, the Australian accounting profession 
was sacrificed in order to achieve the political goal of a smooth entry of Australian 
business to global capital markets through the adoption of international accounting 
standards.  However, if the outcome of the government’s activities follows 
Machiavelli’s theory to the next stage, the profession may well have the last laugh.  
From a Machiavellian perspective, IASB standards can be viewed as a “foreign 
troop”.   By using this foreign troop instead of local or domestic accounting standard 
setters, the diminished role of Australian accounting setters will lead to a decline in 
Australian accounting research and development.  This, in turn, could lead to an 
erosion of Australia’s standing in the global business community and thwart 
government efforts to boost the image of Australian companies and thereby provide 
access to global capital markets.  As explained by Machiavelli: 
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[e]xperience has shown that only rulers and republics that possess their own armies 
are very successful, whereas mercenary armies never achieve anything, and cause 
only harm. And it is more difficult for a citizen to seize power in a republic that 
possesses its own troops than in one that relies upon foreign troops (Machiavelli, 
1988, p44). 
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Figure 1. The Power Structure of Australia’s Executive Government 
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Figure 2. A Rational View of Policy 
Process
 
Figure 3. Pre-CLERP Institutional Arrangements for Accounting Standard 
Setting in Australia  
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Figure 4. Post-CLERP Institutional Arrangements for Accounting Standard 
Setting in Australia 
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